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The Participation of States and Citizens in
Global Governance
SASKIA SASSEN*
The pursuit of global democratic governance cannot be confined to global
institutions; national state institutions and nation-based citizens need to be part
of this project. In this lecture, I want to map a variety of mechanisms and
dynamics that can be seen as part of an architecture for democratic participation
by state institutions and citizens in global governance. Crucial to my analysis is
the notion that the global is multi-scalar: it does not take place only at the self-
evident global scale, but also at the national and sub-national scales.
I identify two partly interrelated domains for exploring this topic. One
domain is the ways in which the state actually participates in governing the
global economy, notwithstanding expanded deregulation and privatization, and
notwithstanding the growing authority of non-state actors. The question
becomes one of detecting the specific type of authority/power this participation
might entail for the state vis-A-vis global actors and processes. Further, if the
state indeed has such authority, or could in principle have it, the question is
whether that authority can be a bridge to a politics of the global for citizens-
who are, after all, still largely confined to the national domain for the full
exercise of their powers.
If national state participation in setting up the legal and institutional
infrastructure for globalization does indeed contain a set of channels for citizens
to demand participation in global politics, including the right to demand
accountability from global actors, then the formal and informal capabilities of
citizens to do so, as well as their disposition to do so, become crucial. This is
the subject of the second domain. The organizing question is: to what extent
citizenship, even though highly formalized, might actually be less finished as an
* Saskia Sassen is the Ralph Leis Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, and Centennial
Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics. She is currently completing her forthcoming book
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institution than its formal representation indicates. What happens when we
begin to think of this highly developed institution as something akin to an
"incompletely theorized" form? Can recognition of these features help us
detect the extent to which the institution might change (i.e. go partly and in
very specific ways beyond its national confinements)? I am particularly
interested here in the possibility that citizenship might find institutional
groundings inside the nation-state that would allow citizens to participate in
global politics. My concern is then not so much in the de-territorializing of the
institution which lies at the heart of post-national conceptions of citizenship,
including prominently the human rights regime, as it is in the denationalizing of
specific features of citizenship arising out of the changes in state institutions
themselves. These changes are briefly described in the first section.
It will clearly be impossible to do full justice to each of these subjects. The
purpose is rather a mapping of the broader structures evident today that might
be useful in situating the question of global democratic governance within a
more complex and diverse set of institutional domains than is usually allowed.
I should add that though the treatment of the subject is partial and brief in this
lecture, it is based on a large multiyear project and hence rests on considerable
evidence and research.'
I. See SASKIA SASSEN, DENATIONALIZATION: TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, AND RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL
DIGITAL AGE (forthcoming 2003).
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2003] STATES AND CITIZENS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
I. THE PARTIAL DENATIONALIZING OF STATE WORK
There is today a growing literature on the state and globalization. 2 My
particular argument is that we are seeing the incipient formation of a type of
authority and state practice that entails a partial denationalizing of what
historically had been constructed as national. In this conceptualization I
introduce a twist in the various analyses on the broader subject. First, my
conceptualization needs to be distinguished from analyses of private authority,
because these emphasize the shift out of the public domain and into the private
domain.4 I seek instead to detect the presence of private agendas and authority
2. A number of scholars have addressed various dimensions of the particular issue that concerns me here,
participation by the state in global processes. For some, states remain the key actors and hence not much has
changed for states and the inter-state system. See generally, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Globalization and the
State, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Edwards and Sisson eds., forthcoming
2003); Louis Pauly, Who Governs the Bankers, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Biersteker et al. eds., forthcoming 2003); Eric Helleiner, Sovereignty, Territoriality and the Globalization of
Finance, in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Smith et al. eds., 1999); PAUL HIRST &
GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION (1996); CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-STATE:
IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (Christian Joppke ed., 1998). For others, even
if states remain important there are today other key actors, and globalization has changed some important
features of states and the interstate system. See generally, e.g., PHILIP G. CERNY, THE CHANGING
ARCHITECTURE OF POLITICS: STRUCTURE, AGENCY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE STATE (1990); Philip G.
Cemy, Structuring the Political Arena: Public Goods, States and Governance in a Globalizing World, in
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY THEORIES (Ronen Palan ed., 2000); ; PRIVATE AUTHORITY
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Claire A. Cutler et al. eds., 1999); POLITICAL SPACE: FRONTIERS OF CHANGE
AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Yale H. Ferguson & R.J.Barry Jones eds., 2002) [hereinafter
POLITICAL SPACE]; Ken Dark, The Informational Reconfiguring of Global Geopolitics, in POLITICAL SPACE:
FRONTIERS OF CHANGE AND GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 61 (Yale H. Ferguson & R.J. Barry
Jones eds., 2002) [hereinafter POLITICAL SPACE]; Ronen Palan, Offshore and the Institutional Environment of
Globalization, in POLITICAL SPACE, supra note 2, at 211. For what is probably the most comprehensive
mapping of the main strands in the scholarship on globalization and the state see DAVID HELD ET AL.,
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND CULTURE (1999), which categorizes the two major
emerging strands as "hyperglobalists," who posit that national states are becoming weak and are on their way
out, and transformationists, who posit that globalization has brought about significant changes in state
authority and the work of states. At a time when we put increasing weight on self-reflexivity, I should perhaps
clarify that Held classifies me as a transformationist, which is appropriate as far as my work on the state goes,
but not quite when I look at structurations of the global that may not run through the state.
3. Even if we accept that the present era is, at a very general level, a continuation of a long history of
changes that have not altered the fundamental fact ofstate primacy, it still leaves us with the need for detailed
research about the specificities of the current changes. Along these lines of analysis, I argue that economic
globalization is in fact a politico-economic system partly located inside national states, thereby having the
effect of partly denationalizing specific, often highly specialized components of state work. See generally
SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, chs. I & 2 (1996)
[hereinafter LOSING CONTROL?]; SASSEN, supra note 1.
4. A growing literature that often overlaps with particular parts of the above cited strands in the
scholarship, see supra note 2, emphasizes the relocation of national public government functions to private
actors both within national and transnational domains. See, e.g., PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 10:5
inside the states that are inside a domain represented as public.5 Second, it
differs from an older scholarly tradition on the captured state which focused on
cooptation of states by private actors, because I emphasize the privatization of
norm-making capacities and the enactment of these norms in the public domain.
My approach also differs from literature that emphasizes the decline and
obsolescence of the state.6 It is closer to the scholarship that emphasizes state
transformation,7 even though this literature tends to discard the specificity of
the current phase of globalization.8
One of my efforts here, then, is to capture the blurring of some
longstanding dualities in state scholarship, notably those concerning the
distinctive spheres of influence of the national and the global, of state and non-
state actors, of the private and the public, respectively.9 While it may indeed be
the case that the two sides of the duality are mostly separate and mutually
exclusive, there are conditions or components that do not fit in this dual
structure. Key among these are some components of the work of ministries of
AFFAIRS, supra note 2; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State.' A Future-Oriented Perspective on the
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'LL. 769(1998). For a state
of the art elaboration of the rise of private authority, see generally PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 2. For the emergence of cross-border governance mechanisms, see generally
POLITICAL SPACE, supra note 2.
5. For a good examination of these issues as they materialize in specific institutional settings, see Aman,
supra note 4. An excellent collection of essays that seeks to capture these types of dynamics can be found in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES (Michael Likosky ed., 2002), see especially Michael Likosky, Cultural
Imperialism in the Context of Transnational Commercial Collaboration, in id.
6. Perhaps the best known, though not necessarily the most precise authors here are KENICHI OHMAE,
THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES (1995) and WALTER B. WRISTON,
THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: HOW THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD
(1992). See also Stephen J. Kobrin, The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations, 112 FOREIGN POL'Y 97
(1998); Benjamin J. Cohen, Electronic Money: New Day or False Dawn?, 8 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 197
(2001), available at http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/recent/emoney.html.
7. There is today a growing literature that interprets deregulation and privatization as the incorporation by
the state of its own shrinking role; in its most formalized version, this position emphasizes the state's
constitutionalizing of its own diminished role. See, e.g., ROBERT W. COX, PRODUCTION, POWER, AND
WORLD ORDER: SOCIAL FORCES IN THE MAKING OF HISTORY (1987); Leo Panitch, Rethinking the Role of the
State, in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 83 (James Mittelman ed., 1996) [hereinafter CRITICAL
REFLECTIONS]; Stephen Gill, The Emerging World Order and European Change, in NEW WORLD ORDER?
THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1992 157 (Ralph Milliband & Leo Panitch eds., 1992); JAMES H. MITTELMAN, THE
GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME: TRANSFORMATION AND RESISTANCE (2000).
8. Perhaps the best example is Helleiner, who examines the regulatory changes brought on by the
emergence of global financial systems and shows how states remain as key actors. See Helleiner, supra note
2.
9. A good source on these dualities is THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE: DEMOCRACY,
AUTONOMY, AND CONFLICT IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Edward Mansfield & Richard
Sisson eds., 2003), containing papers by major scholars in international relations addressing key issues about
the state and the current features of the interstate system, with responses by critics from several disciplines.
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finance, central banks, and the increasingly specialized technical regulatory
agencies, such as those concerned with finance, telecommunications, and
competition policy.' In this regard, then, my position is not comfortably
subsumed under the proposition that little has changed in terms of state power,
nor can it be subsumed under the proposition that the state is declining in
significance.
An important methodological assumption here is that focusing on economic
globalization can help us disentangle some of these issues." In strengthening
the legitimacy of claims by foreign investors and firms, economic globalization
adds to and renders visible the work of the state aimed at accommodating their
rights and contracts in what remain basically national economies. These
dynamics, however, can also be present when privatization and deregulation
concern native firms and investors, even though in much of the world
privatization and deregulation have been constituted through the entry of
foreign investors and firms. A key organizing proposition, derived from my
previous work on global cities, is the embeddedness of much of globalization in
national economies and polities, that is to say, in a geographic terrain that has
10. See, e.g., MARK W. ZACHER & BRENT A. SUTTON, GOVERNING GLOBAL NETWORKS:
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (1996); George A. Bermann,
International Regulatory Cooperation and US Federalism, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION:
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 373-84 (Bermann et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION]; Joel R. Paul, Implementing Regulatory Cooperation Through
Executive Agreements and the Problem of Democratic Accountability, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY
COOPERATION, supra note 10, at 385-404; Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation and the
Problem of Democracy, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra note 10, at 469-80.
11. Beyond issues pertaining to the global economy, the question of state participation is also at the heart of
a far broader debate about globalization and the state. There is an older scholarship on world-order systems
(e.g. RICHARD FALK, EXPLORATIONS AT THE EDGE OF TIME: THE PROSPECTS FOR WORLD ORDER (1992);
Richard Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS: BEYOND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 39-
50 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship]) recently
invigorated by debates about cosmopolitanism. See, e.g., David Held, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL
ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND
THE GLOBAL ORDER]; HELD ET AL., supra note 2. It examines and theorizes the possibilities of transcending
nationally oriented state authority and instituting world-level institutional orders. This literature often includes
partial world-level orders such as the international human rights regime or certain features of international
environmental treaties, and, quite prominently, discussions about the possibility of a global civil society. See
generally, e.g., GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Alison Brysk ed., 2002) (international human rights);
RONNIE D. LIPSCHUTZ & JUDITH MAYER, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE: THE POLITICS OF NATURE FROM PLACE TO PLANET (1996) (international environmental
treaties); HELD ET AL., supra note 2; GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2002 (Glasius et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter
GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2002]. See also infra note 15.
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been encased in an elaborate set of national laws and administrative
capacities. 12
The embeddedness of the global requires at least a partial lifting of these
national encasements and hence signals a necessary participation by the state,
even when it concerns the state's own withdrawal from regulating the
economy.' 3  The question is whether the weight of private, often foreign,
interests in this specific work of the state becomes constitutive of a particular
form of state authority that does not replace but works alongside older, well-
established forms of state authority.' 4 My argument below will be that the mix
of processes we describe as globalization is indeed producing, deep inside the
national state, a very partial but significant form of authority, a hybrid that is
neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully national nor fully global.'"
12. For a development of some of these issues please refer to Saskia Sassen, Territory and Territoriality in
the Global Economy 15 INT'L Soc. 372-93 (2000). In this context, I find interesting parallels in a specific
type of legal scholarship focused on the construction ofjurisdictions and the locating of particular issues in
jurisdictions that may today be less and less adequate; see, for instance the extraordinary analysis in Judith
Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619-80 (2001).
13. On the one hand, there is an enormously elaborate body of law developed in good measure over the last
hundred years which secures the exclusive territorial authority of national states to an extent not seen in earlier
centuries. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); Friedrich
Kratochwil, Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality, 39 WORLD POL. 27 (1986); John Gerard Ruggie,
Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139 (1993);
HENDRICK SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS (1994). On the other hand, we see today
a considerable institutionalizing, especially in the 1990s, of the "rights" of non-national firms, the deregulation
of cross-border transactions, and the growing influence/power of some of the supranational organizations. See
generally, e.g., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS]; LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD (2000); ROBERTO. KEOHANE
& JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE (2001); ROBERT GILPIN & JEAN M. GILPIN, THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2000); MITTELMAN, supra note 7. If securing these rights, options,
and powers entailed an even partial relinquishing of components of state authority as constructed over the last
century, then we can posit that this sets up the conditions for a necessary engagement by national states in the
process of globalization. See generally LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 3; SASSEN, supra note 1.
14. Several scholars have focused on the nature of this engagement. See generally, e.g., Strange, supra
note 2; Jan Aart Scholte, Global Capitalism and the State, 73 INT'L AFFAIRS 427 (1997); CERNY, supra note
2; Dark, supra note 2; GLOBAL CAPITALISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY (Leo Panitch & Colin Leys eds., 1999)
[hereinafter GLOBAL CAPITALISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY]; PAUL N. DOREMUS ET AL., THE MYTH OF THE
GLOBAL CORPORATION (1999); Boris Kagarlitsky, The Challenge for the Left: Reclaiming the State, in
GLOBAL CAPITALISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY, supra note 14. One way of organizing the major issues is to ask
whether the role of the state is simply one of reducing its authority, e.g. as suggested with terms such as
deregulation and privatisation, and generally "less government," or whether it also requires the production of
new types of regulations, legislative items, court decisions, in brief, the production of a whole series of new
"legalities." I use this term to distinguish this production from "law" or "jurisprudence." See LOSING
CONTROL?, supra note 3, ch. 1.
15. Among the issues raised by this type of analysis are the increased autonomy and influence of the types
of processes and actors described supra note 11, as well as a variety of non-state actors. The literature on non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), including transnational ones (TNGOs), and the associated forms of
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As states participate in the implementation of cross-border regimes,
whether the global economic system or the international human rights regime,
they have undergone at times significant transformations because this
accommodation involves a negotiation. In the case of the global economy, this
negotiation entails the development inside national states-through legislative
acts, court rulings, executive orders, and policy-of the mechanisms necessary
for the reconstitution of certain components of national capital into "global
capital," and necessary to develop and ensure new types of rights/entitlements
for foreign capital 16 in what are still national territories, in principle under the
exclusive authority of their states.17
These particular transformations inside the state are partial and incipient,
but strategic. Such transformations can weaken or alter the organizational
architecture for the implementation of international law insofar as
activism, have also generated a series of interesting insights into the changed position of states in a context of
multiple globalizations. See generally, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); CONTESTING GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Robert
O'Brien et al. eds., 2000); CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (John Boli et al. eds., 1999). For a critical account that partly rejects the notion
that these non-state actors actually represent a politics that undermines existing forms of authority, including
that of the state, see Andr6 C. Drainville, Left Internationalism and the Politics of Resistance in the New
World Order, in A NEW WORLD ORDER?: GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
217 (David A. Smith & J6zsef B6rtcz eds., 1995). 1 would also include here a variety of emergent global
networks that are fighting equally emergent global agents such as trafficking gangs (e.g. Global Survival
Network 1997; Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking, Annual). For a general review of these types of
organizations see Saskia Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for
Politics, 46 RACE & ETHNICITY 4 (2002). Along these lines a new set of concrete instances has come about
with the September I1, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center-i.e. the use by international organized
terrorism of the global financial system and the international immigration regime. For a variety of analyses,
see UNDERSTANDING SEPTEMBER II (Craig J. Calhoun et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
SEPTEMBER 11 ]; Saskia Sassen, Global Cities and Diasporic Networks: Microsites in Global Civil Society,
in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2002, supra note 11, at 217.
16. Seen from the perspective of firms and investors operating transnationally, the objective is to enjoy the
protections traditionally exercised by the state in the national realm of the economy for national firms, notably
guaranteeing property rights and contracts. How this gets done may involve a range of options. See
generally, e.g., PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (Claire A. Cutler et al. eds., 1999);
PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 2.
17. Two very different bodies of scholarship which develop lines of analysis that can help in capturing
some of these conditions are represented by the work of Rousenau, particularly his examination of the
domestic "frontier" inside the national state, and by the work of Walker problematizing the distinction
inside/outside in international relations theory. See JAMES N. ROSENEAU, ALONG THE DOMESTIC-FOREIGN
FRONTIER: EXPLORING GOVERNANCE IN A TROUBLED WORLD (1997); R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY (1993). An interesting variant on this subject is
INTERVENTION AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN AFRICA: GLOBAL-LocAL NETWORKS OF POWER (Thomas
Callaghy et al. eds., 200 1), which examines the proliferation of global non-state centered networks in the case
of Africa.
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implementation depends on the institutional apparatus of national states.
Further, these transformations have also created the conditions whereby some
parts of national states actually gain relative power as a result of that
participation in the development of a global economy.18 As particular
components of national states become the institutional home for the operation
of some of the dynamics that are central to globalization, they undergo change
that is difficult to register or name. This is one instantiation of what I call a
process of incipient denationalization-that is of specific components of
national states that function as such institutional homes.
This partial, often highly specialized or at least particularized,
denationalization can also take place in domains other than that of economic
globalization, notably the more recent developments in the human rights regime
that allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators19 or that grant
undocumented immigrants certain rights.20  Denationalization is, thus,
multivalent: it endogenizes many different types of global agendas, not only
those of corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights
objectives. Here I confine myself to economic globalization.
The question for research then becomes what is actually "national" in some
of the institutional components of states linked to the implementation and
regulation of economic globalization. The hypothesis here would be that some
components of national institutions, though formally national, are not national
in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term over the last
hundred years. One of the roles of the state vis-d-vis today's global economy
has been to negotiate the intersection of national law and foreign actors-
whether firms, markets or supranational organizations. This raises a question as
to whether there are particular conditions that make execution of this role in the
current phase distinctive from what it may have been in earlier phases of the
world economy.
We need to understand more about the nature of this engagement than is
represented by concepts such as deregulation. It is becoming clear that the role
of the state in the process of deregulation involves the production of new types
of regulations, legislative items, court decisions2 '-in brief, the production of a
18. LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 3, chs. I & 2.
19. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation,
24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 401 (2002).
20. 1 return to this issue in the second half of the lecture. See infra note 70.
21. See, e.g., Panitch, supra note 7; Phillip Cerny, Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of
Political Globalization, 32 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 251-74 (1997). See also generally SOL PICCIOTTO,
[Vol. 10:5
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whole series of new "legalities., 22  The state's role is also evident in the
proliferation of specialized, often semi-autonomous regulatory agencies and the
specialized cross-border networks they are forming, which are taking over
functions once enclosed in national legal frameworks.23 The background
condition here is that the state remains the ultimate guarantor of the "rights" of
global capital, i.e. the protection of contracts and property rights, and, more
generally, a major legitimator of claims.24 It is in this sense that the state can be
seen as incorporating the work of shrinking its own role in regulating economic
transactions 2' and giving the global project operational effectiveness and
26legitimacy. The state here can be conceived of as representing a technical
administrative capacity which at this time cannot be replicated by any other
institutional arrangement. Furthermore, this is a capacity backed by military
power-though exercise of this power is not an option in many countries-and
by global power in the case of some states. To some extent this work of states
is becoming privatized, as is signaled by the growth of international commercial
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAXATION: A STUDY IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BUSINESS REGULATION
(1992); SOL PICCOTrrO & RUTH MAYNE, REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION
(1999).
22. For a broad range of views see, e.g., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 13;
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000). For more
particular cases of this broader issue, see PICCIOTTO & MAYNE, supra note 21; Aihwa Ong, Strategic
Sisterhood or Sisters in Solidarity? Questions of Communitarianism and Citizenship in Asia, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 107 (1996); ROSENEAU, supra note 17; BARRY EICHENGREEN & ALBERT FISHLOW,
CONTENDING WITH CAPITAL FLOWS (1996); Aman, supra note 4.
23. We can see this in particular features of a variety of domains: for instance, competition policy, specific
aspects of international business collaboration, in networks among members of the judiciary, and, in a very
different domain, the new opening among the top leadership in a growing number of unions to organizing
immigrants. See generally, e.g., EDWARD 0. GRAHAM & J.D. RICHARDSON, GLOBAL COMPETITION POuCY
(1997); Brian Portnoy, Constructing Competition: The Political Foundations ofAlliance Capitalism (Ph.D.
dissertation, 1999) (both dealing with competition policy); JOHN DUNNING, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM AND
GLOBAL BUSINESS (1997); 6 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. (1998) (special issue dealing with international
business collaboration); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks
Accountable, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION, supra note 10, at 521-46 (judicial networks);
LEAH HAUS, UNIONS, IMMIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONALIZATION: NEW CHALLENGES AND CHANGING
CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE (2002) (organizing immigrants).
24. While it is well known, it is worth remembering that this guarantee of the rights of capital is embedded
in a certain type of state, a certain conception of the rights of capital, and a certain type of international legal
regime: it is largely embedded in the state of the most developed and most powerful countries in the world, in
western notions of contract and property rights, and in new legal regimes aimed at furthering economic
globalization--e.g. the push to get countries to support copyright law. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Transfer of
Technology in the Contemporary International Order, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2096, 2102-11 (1999)
(discussing the handling of something as neutral in appearance as technology transfers in the emerging
international legal regime for these transactions).
25. See Gill, supra note 7; Panitch, supra note 7.
26. See generally LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 3, chs. I & 2; SASSEN, supra note 1.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES
arbitration,27 and by key elements of the new privatized institutional order for
28governing the global economy.
Legislative items, executive orders, adherence to new technical standards,
and so on, will all have to be produced through the particular institutional and
political structures of each participating state. Even when imposed from the
outside, there is specific work that individual states need to do.29  The
emergent, often imposed, consensus in the community of states to further
globalization is not merely a political decision; it entails specific types of work
by a large number of distinct state institutions in each of these countries.
Clearly, the role of the state will vary significantly depending on the power it
may have both internally and internationally. Some states, particularly the
United States and the United Kingdom, are producing the design for many of
these new legalities-i.e. items derived from Anglo-American commercial law
and accounting standards-and are hence imposing these on other states
through the interdependencies at the heart of the current phase of globalization.
This creates and imposes a set of specific constraints on the other participating
states.3°
This dynamic contains an interesting dialectic. These types of state
participation can strengthen the forces that challenge or destabilize what have
31historically been constructed as state powers. In my reading, this holds not
only for weak states but also for the most powerful ones. The U.S. government,
as the hegemonic power of this period, has led/forced other states to adopt these
27. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE. INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996);
JESWALD SALACUSE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS: NEGOTIATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE
(1991).
28. See generally PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 2.
29. In terms of research and theorization, this is a vast uncharted terrain: it would require examining how
that production takes place and gets legitimated in different countries. This signals the posibility of cross-
national variations (which then would need to be established, measured, and interpreted).
30. This dominance assumes many forms and does not only affect poorer and weaker countries. France,
for instance, ranks among the top providers of information services and industrial engineering services in
Europe and has a strong, though not outstanding, position in financial and insurance services. However, it has
found itself at an increasing disadvantage in legal and accounting services because Anglo-American law and
standards dominate in international transactions. Anglo-American firms with offices in Paris service the legal
needs of firms, whether French or foreign, operating out of France. See Sassen, supra note 12, at 382.
Similarly, Anglo-American law is increasingly dominant in international commercial arbitration, an institution
grounded in continental traditions ofjurisprudence, particularly French and Swiss. See generally DEZALAY &
GARTH, supra note 27.
31. See GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND THE ORIGINS OF
OUR TIMES 239-69 (1994); see also Scholarly Controversy: Chaos and Governance, in 13 POLITICAL POWER
AND SOCIAL THEORY, pt. IV (Diana E. Davis ed., 1999).
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obligations towards global capital and, in so doing, has contributed to the
globalization of conditions that reduce particular forms of state authority both
in the U.S. and in more and more countries around the world. This becomes
evident when viewed in light of the fact that while the state continues to play a
crucial, though no longer exclusive, role in the production of legality around
new forms of economic activity, at least some of this production of legalities is
increasingly feeding the power of new emerging structures, whether global
markets for capital, the World Trade Organization, or the international human
rights regime.
A crucial part of the argument is the fact of the institutional and locational
embeddedness of globalization. While this is not the place to discuss this
embeddedness, let me specify why it matters.32 First, it provides the empirical
specification underlying my assertion that the state is engaged, which in turn
feeds the proposition about the denationalizing of particular state functions and
capacities. Second, it signals that the range of ways in which the state could be
involved is far broader than what it is today-largely confined to furthering
economic globalization.
Conceivably, state involvement could address a whole series of global
issues, including the democratic deficit in the multilateral system governing
globalization.33 State participation could create an enabling environment not
only for global corporate capital but also for those seeking to subject the latter
to greater accountability and public scrutiny. But unlike what has happened
with global corporate capital, the necessary legal and administrative instruments
and regimes have not been developed that would allow citizens to participate in
global governance through state institutions. The trade-offs and the resources
that can be mobilized are quite different in the case of citizens seeking to
32. 1 have developed this at greater length addressing an audience of legal scholars in Sassen, The
Repositioning ofLeadership, supra note 15. See also the development of the argument focusing on private
rather than state actors in SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY (2nd ed., 2001).
33. There are several types of analyses that address particular forms of this question. See, e.g., HELD ET
AL., supra note 2; Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 429 (1995); Aman, supra
note 4 (all on how states could participate in global governance); Warren Magnusson, Politicizing the Global
City, in BEING POLITICAL: GENEALOGIES OF CITIZENSHIP 289 (Engin Isin ed., 2000); POLITICAL SPACE,
supra note 2 (both on how to rethink political space); A. BRYSK & GERSHON SAFFIR, THE CITIZENSHIP GAP
(forthcoming 2003) (on the citizenship gap in a global world and what states could do). For a very particular
angle on these issues see UNDERSTANDING SEPTEMBER 11, supra note 15, for a variety of authors seeking to
understand how the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 forced a rethinking of how
globalization has repositioned the U.S. state in the world and how to respond to the new types of organized
international terrorism.
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globalize their capacities for governing compared to those of global capital
seeking to form regimes that enable and protect it.
In the next section I examine some of these issues from the perspective of
the institution of citizenship. This produces a distinct domain for global
politics--one that is distinct from the notion, developed above, that state
participation in the global economy should function as a bridge for a country's
citizens to participate in global governance. I see, however, an emergent
institutional resonance between the features of the state discussed here and the
features of an evolving institution of citizenship in the next section.
II. THE REPOSITIONING OF CITIZENSHIP
Citizenship, the foundational institution for membership in the modem
state, is being partly destabilized through current developments associated with
globalization.34 Some of the major transformations occurring today under the
impact of globalization may give citizenship yet another set of features as it
continues to respond to the conditions within which it is embedded - a
characteristic of its history. One possible materialization is that the
nationalizing of the institution that took place over the last several centuries
may today give way to a partial de-nationalizing. One might then hypothesize
that this could produce institutional resonance with the processes of
denationalization discussed in the preceding section. Such a possibility raises a
number of questions for which it is too early to find answers. But, conceivably,
this institutional resonance could position citizens, still largely nation-based, as
participants in an emergent domain of global governance.
Though often talked about as a single concept and experienced as a unitary
institution, citizenship actually describes a number of discrete but related
aspects of the relationship between the individual and the polity. Current
developments are bringing to light the distinctiveness of these various aspects,
from formal rights to practices and psychological dimensions.35 These
34. Globalization also contributes to the destabilization of alienage, the other foundational institution for
membership in the modem state. See generally Saskia Sassen, The Repositioning of Citizenship, 46
BERKELEY J. Soc. 4 (2002).
35. There is today a large body of scholarship that critiques the assumption that identity is basically tied to
a national polity. It covers a broad range of positions even when the central point is the same. Compare
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994), and IuIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE (1990) (both focusing on the fact that people often maintain stronger allegiances to and
identification with particular cultural and social groups within the nation than with the nation at large), with
[Vol. 10:5
STATES AND CITIZENS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
developments also bring to the fore the tension between citizenship as a formal
legal status and as a normative project or an aspiration.36 The formal equality
that attaches to all citizens rarely embodies substantive equality in social terms.
Current conditions have led to a growing emphasis on rights and aspirations
that go beyond the formal legal definition of rights and obligations.37 The
growing prominence of an international human rights regime has produced
areas of convergence even as it has underlined the differences between
citizenship rights and human rights.38
Insofar as citizenship is a status that articulates legal rights and
responsibilities, the mechanisms through which this articulation is shaped and
implemented can be analytically distinguished from the status itself. In the
medieval cities so admired by Max Weber, it was urban residents themselves
who set up the structures through which to establish and thicken the conditions
of citizenship. 39  Today it is largely set up by the national state. With
globalization, the associated changes in the national state, as well as the
ascendance of human rights, these mechanisms may well begin to change once
again. 40 Further, the actual content and shape of some of the legal rights and
obligations may also change.
Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHICS 275 (1989)
(arguing that the notion of a national identity is based on the suppression of social and cultural differences).
36. For an example that engages the notion ofglobal public goods or a global public commons, see Thomas
W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48 (1992) (identifying a sort of global sense of
solidarity and identification, partly out of humanitarian convictions). Notions of the ultimate unity of human
experience are part of a long tradition. Today there are also more practical considerations at work, such as
global ecological interdependence, economic globalization, global media and commercial culture, all of which
create structural interdependencies and senses of global responsibility. See generally, e.g., Falk, The Making
of Global Citizenship, supra note 11; David B Hunter, Toward Global Citizenship in International
Environmental Law, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 547 (1992); DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER, supra
note 11.
37. This has contributed to a reinvigoration of theoretical distinctions: communitarian and deliberative;
republican and liberal; feminist, post-national and cosmopolitan notions of citizenship. See, e.g., SEYLA
BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS
(1992); THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998); Ong, supra note 22.
38. See generally GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11; see also generally WOMEN,
CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENCE (Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werbner eds., 1999) (a feminist perspective).
39. Important to my analysis is the fact that these urban residents were pursuing a specific project: the
right to protect their property from the abuses of various powerful actors such as local lords and the church.
Their project was not citizenship the way we think of it now, but in their particular material and normative
practices they produced foundational elements for what eventually became the modem institution of
citizenship. See Sassen, supra note 34 (illustrating the fact that current transnational practices may well be
feeding the possibility of transnational notions/experienceslimaginaries of citizenship).
40. See generally DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE GLOBAL CITY (Engin F. Isin ed., 2000). For
instance, a growing number of scholars concerned with identity and solidarity posit the rise of transnational
identities and translocal loyalties. See, e.g., Maria de los Angeles Torres, Transnational Political and
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Many of the dynamics which built economies, polities, and societies in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries contained an articulation between the
national scale and the growth of entitlements for citizens. During
industrialization, class formation, class struggles, and the advantages of both
employers and workers tended to scale at the national level and became
identified with state-produced legislation and regulations, entitlements and
obligations. The state came to be seen as a key to ensuring the well-being of
significant portions of both the working class and the bourgeoisie. The
development of welfare states in the twentieth century became a crucial
institutional domain for granting entitlements to the poor and the
disadvantaged.
The growing articulation of globalization with national economies and the
associated withdrawal of the state from various spheres of citizenship
entitlements raises the possibility of a corresponding dilution of loyalty to the
state.4 ' In turn, citizens' loyalty may be less crucial to the state today than it
was at a time of intense warfare and its accompanying need for loyal citizen-
soldiers.42 Masses of troops today can be replaced by technologically-intensive
methods of warfare. Most importantly, in the highly developed world, warfare
has mostly become a less significant event partly due to economic globalization,
Cultural Identities: Crossing Theoretical Borders, in BORDERLESS BORDERS (Frank Bonilla et al. eds.,
1998); ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (1996);
Robin Cohen, Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers, 72 INT'L AFF. 507, 517-18
(1996); Thomas M. Franck, Community Based on Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41,42 (1997).
The growth of European citizenship developing as part of the European Union (EU) integration process is
seen by some as going beyond the formal status of EU citizenship. See, e.g., YASEMIN NUHOCLU SOYSAL,
LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 1 (1994) (discussing "the
changing institution and meaning of citizenship in contemporary nation-states"); Engin F. lsin, Introduction to
DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE GLOBAL CITY, supra, at 1-22; Gerard Delanty, The Resurgence of the
City in Europe? The Spaces of European Citizenship, in DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND THE GLOBAL CITY,
supra, at 79-92; Bryan S. Turner, Cosmopolitan Virtue: Loyalty and the City, in DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP
AND THE GLOBAL CITY, supra at 129-48 (noting a growing cultural awareness of a "European identity").
41. It is important to remember that the institutionalizing of "loyalty to the state" has itself undergone
major historical transformations, a fact that makes evident its historicity rather than "natural" status. Before
the Industrial Revolution, this bond was seen as insoluble or at least exclusive. As Rubenstein and Adler put
it, while the bond of "insoluble allegiance was defensible in times of limited individual mobility," it became
difficult in the face of large scale migration which was part of the new forms of industrial development.
Insoluble was gradually replaced by exclusive, hence singular but changeable allegiance as the basis of
nationality. Where the doctrine of insoluble allegiance is a product of Medieval Europe, the development of
exclusive allegiance reflects the political context of the second half of the nineteenth century, when state
sovereignty became the organizing principle of an international system-albeit a system centered in and
largely ruled by Europe. Kim Rubenstein & Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of
Nationality in a Globalized World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 519, 531-33 (2000).
42. See CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL THEORY (Bryan S. Turner ed., 1993); Turner, supra note 40.
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that is to say, the fact that crucial economic systems and dynamics now
increasingly scale at the global level. With some exceptions, global firms and
global markets do not want the rich countries to fight wars among themselves.
The "international" project is radically different from what it was in the
nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries.
The construction of political membership as a national category is for us an
inherited condition. The high level of institutional formalization and socio-
cultural thickness of this type of membership makes it difficult to experience
the historicity of this construction. It is easily naturalized. Crucial in the
evolution of both citizenship and the national state has been the will of the latter
to render national major conditions that might well have followed a different
trajectory. Among these conditions are membership and allegiance. For most
of western history, territory was subject to multiple systems of rule-the king,
the local lord, the church-and so was membership. The nationalizing of
territory and allegiance entailed the encasement of geographic territory into an
elaborate institutional system; territory became state territoriality, and identity
became nation-based citizenship.
Addressing the question of citizenship in the context of significant
transformations in the condition of the national generally and the nation-state in
particular entails a specific stance. It is quite possible to posit that, at the most
abstract or formal level, not much has changed over the last century in the
essential features of citizenship. The theoretical ground from which I address
the issue is that of the historicity and the embeddedness of both categories,
citizenship and the national state, rather than their purely formal features. Each
of these has been constructed in elaborate and formal ways. And each has
evolved historically as a tightly packaged bundle of what were in fact often
rather diverse elements.
Today several major dynamics are destabilizing these particular bundlings,
and bringing to the fore the fact of that bundling and its particularity. Among
these dynamics are, crucially, globalization and digitization as well as a range
of emergent political practices often involving hitherto silent or silenced
population groups and organizations.43 Through their destabilizing effects,
43. These changes include a very broad range of dynamics and conditions, among which are the impact of
global forces that challenge the authority of nation-states and in so doing not only formally reduce the power
of citizens but also enable forms of"citizenship" that do not fit into the established hierarchies of formalized
power between states and the interstate system. Thus I include here specific institutions such as the U.N.
system and the European Union, and, in the economic realms, the new importance of the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank, and new types of supranational institutions such as the World Trade
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these dynamics are producing operational and rhetorical openings for the
emergence of new types of political subjects and new spatialities for politics.
More broadly, the destabilizing of national state-centered hierarchies of
legitimate power and allegiance has enabled a multiplication of non-formalized,
or only partly formalized, political dynamics and actors.44
These developments, some advanced and others incipient, signal the need
to expand the analytic terrain within which to understand the question of
citizenship and citizen rights and obligations in the current era. They do not
signal the overhaul of the institution. In my reading we are dealing with very
partial and particular developments, though many are at the edges of the
institution and are easily disregarded. Yet in my mapping of globalization
today, these particular and partial transformations in state work and in citizens'
work need to be recognized. The extent to which these transformations will
become institutionalized and formalized is likely to vary sharply. From my
perspective, it is important to capture also those changes that are not likely to
become formalized, at least any time soon. This probably constitutes an
important difference compared to how a legal scholar would map the issues.
Nature may abhor a vacuum, but lawyers abhor informal practices and norms,
no matter how thick.
Here I can address only a few of these markers of an expanded analytic
terrain for understanding citizenship. Perhaps the most prominent mode of
conceptualizing these kinds of developments is that they signal a
deterritorializing of citizenship practices and identities, and of discourses about
loyalty and allegiance. The literature on post-national citizenship captures this
well.45
Organization, all of which can determine to a large extent domestic economic performance. But these
changes also include new developments of the human rights regime and the rapid growth of NGOs and
TNGOs and their growing participation in cross border politics. Conceivably, these developments affect
citizenship rights, even though this is typically a highly intermediated process. Some components of this
process run through the changes in state institutions and policies that alter the relationship between the citizen
and the state. Others run through the international human rights regime, signaling the possibility that human
rights will have an expanded role in the normative regulation of politics as politics becomes more global. See
SASSEN, supra note 1.
44. See Sassen, supra note 34.
45. The emergence of transnational social and political communities constituted through transborder
migration is increasingly being conceptualized as the basis for new forms of citizenship identity to the extent
that members maintain identification and solidarities with one another across state territorial divides. These
citizenship identities arise out of networks, activities, and ideologies that span the home and the host society.
See generally LINDA BASCH ET AL., NATIONS UNBOUND: TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS, POSTCOLONIAL
PREDICAMENTS, AND DETERRITORIALIZED NATION-STATES (1994); RAINER BAUBOCK, TRANSNATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP: MEMBERSHIP AND RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1994); SOYSAL, supra note 40;
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For my argument, it is important to recognize how and whether specific
transformations inside the national state have directly and indirectly altered
particular features of the institution of citizenship. These transformations are
not predicated necessarily on deterritorialization or location of the institution
outside the national state, as is key to conceptions of post-national citizenship,
and hence are usefully distinguished from current notions of post-national
citizenship. I refer to these as denationalized components, emergent and
typically not yet formalized, in the institution of citizenship.46 By tracing what
are at this time micro-transformations in the institution of citizenship on the
inside of the national state (rather than outside as in post-national conceptions),
I make a parallel conceptual framing to that in the first section of this lecture.47
The question then is not simply one of the deterritorializing of citizenship but
also one of tracing where we see continuities and changes in the formal bundle
of rights at the heart of the institution and when the changes represent a
movement towards post-national and/or denationalized features of citizenship.
Further, one needs to trace how informal citizenship practices engender
formalizations of new types of rights.
Of particular interest to my analysis is the possibility that the formal rights
of the institution also might evince change, and thereby signal that it is not
necessarily a completed institution. Equal citizenship is central to the modem
institution of citizenship, and the expansion of equality among citizens has
shaped a good part of its evolution in the twentieth century. There is debate as
to what brought about the expanded inclusions over this period, most notably
the granting of the vote to women. For some, national law has been crucial in
promoting measures that recognized and sought to eliminate exclusions. 4' Yet,
insofar as equality is based on membership, citizenship status forms the basis of
an exclusive politics and identity. Politics and identity have been essential
because they provide the sense of solidarity necessary for the development of
modem citizenship in the nation-state.
Robert Smith, Transnational Migration, Assimilation, and Political Community, in THE CITY AND THE
WORLD: NEW YoRK's GLOBAL FUTURE 110 (Margaret E. Crahan & Alberto Vourvoulias-Bush eds., 1997).
46. But see Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 452 (2000)
(using the term "denationalized" as interchangeable with "post-national"). Instead, I specify the theoretical
and political utility of differentiating these two terms.
47. Compare the specific and partial internal reorientations to the global in national state institutions. See
supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Law, and the American Nation, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 595, 598 (2000).
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In a country such as the United States, the principle of equal citizenship
remains unfulfilled, even after the successful struggles and legal advances of
the last five decades.49 Groups defined by race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, and other "identities" still face various exclusions from full
participation in public life. This is especially true at the level of practice even
in the face of changes in formal legal status. Second, because full participation
as a citizen rests on a material base, poverty excludes large sectors of the
population, and the gap is widening. 50 Feminist and race-critical scholarships
have highlighted the failure of gender- and race-neutral conceptions, such as the
legal status of citizenship, to account for the differences of individuals within
communities.51 In brief, legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal
membership rights. Citizenship is affected by the position of different groups
within a nation-state.
But the position of these different groups has also engendered the practices
and struggles that forced changes in the institution of citizenship itself. For
Karst, in the United States, national law "braided the strands of citizenship"-
formal legal status, rights, belonging-into the principle of equal citizenship.1
2
This took place through a series of Supreme Court decisions and acts of
Congress, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Karst emphasizes how
important these constitutional and legislative instruments are, and that we
cannot take citizenship for granted or be complacent about it.
There are two aspects here that matter for my argument. First, the history
of interactions between differential positionings and expanded inclusions
signals the possibility that the new conditions of inequality and difference
evident today, and the new types of claim-making they produce, may well bring
about further transformations in the institution. Citizenship is produced partly
by the practices of the excluded. Second, by expanding the formal inclusionary
aspect of citizenship, the national state contributed to some of the conditions
that eventually would facilitate key aspects of post-national and denationalized
49. Id. at 597.
50. This is well developed in the works of Thomas H. Marshall. E.g., THOMAS H. MARSHALL, SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1975); see also Joel Handler, Quiescence: The Scylla and Charybdis
of Empowerment, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE
WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Frank Munger ed., 2002).
51. See generally SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE
GLOBAL ERA (2002); KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2000).
52. Karst, supra note 48, at 597.
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citizenship. At the same time, insofar as the state itself has undergone
significant transformation, notably the changes bundled under the notion of the
competitive state, it may reduce the likelihood that state institutions will do the
type of legislative and judiciary work that has led to expanded formal
inclusions.
The consequence of these two developments may well be the absence of a
linear progression in the evolution of the institution, a progression that is a key
53assumption in much of the literature on citizenship. For instance, in the case
of the United States, the expanding inclusions that we have seen since the
1960s may have produced conditions which enact forms of citizenship that
follow a different trajectory, e.g. minoritizing one's identity as a basis for
claim-making. Additionally, the pressures of globalization on national states
may mean that claim-making will increasingly be directed at other institutions
as well. This is already evident in a variety of instances. One example is the
decision by first-nation people to go directly to the United Nations and claim
direct representation in international fora, rather than going through the
particular national states within which they are subsumed. The pressures of
globalization are also evident in the increasingly institutionalized framework of
the international human rights regime and the emergent possibilities for
bypassing unilateral state sovereignty.
As the centrality of substantive equality in citizenship has grown in
importance and become a more visible issue, and as the importance of national
law to giving presence/voice to silenced minorities has grown, the tension
between the legal status and the normative project of citizenship has also
grown. For many, citizenship is becoming a normative project whereby social
membership becomes increasingly comprehensive and open-ended.1
4
Globalization and human rights are further enabling this tension and
contributing the elements of a new discourse on rights. Though in very
different ways, both globalization and the human rights regime have rendered
existing political hierarchies of legitimate power and allegiance more relative
over the last decade.55 All of this raises a fundamental question about what the
53. See, e.g., THOMAS H. MARSHALL & TOM BOTrOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1992).
54. See generally GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11. See also DAVID JACOBSON,
RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP 38-41 (1996); Bosniak, supra
note 46 (providing a good review); Lynn A. Staeheli, Globalization and the Scales of Citizenship, 19
GEOGRAPHY RES. F. 60-77 (1999) (providing an analytic perspective). See also generally THE CITIZENSHIP
DEBATES, supra note 37.
55. This is quite evident in how nationality was conceived. The aggressive nationalism and territorial
competition between states in the eighteenth, nineteenth and well into the twentieth centuries made the
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analytic terrain is within which to place the question of rights, authority and
obligations. 56 These developments position citizens to participate in globalizing
political domains through the partial reshaping of their political subjectivity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The trends that have come together towards the end of the twentieth
century are contributing to the destabilization of the meaning of citizenship as it
was forged in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries. Economic
policies and technical developments we associate with globalization have
strengthened the importance of cross-border dynamics and systems. The
growing emphasis is on notions of the "competitive state" and the associated
dismantling of social rights.
Emphasis on markets has brought into question the foundations of the
welfare state. Marshall saw, and many others continue to see, the welfare state
as an important ingredient of social citizenship. 5 7 For many critics, the reliance
on markets to solve political and social problems is a savage attack on the
principles of citizenship; for others, the collapse of socialist states is a triumph
of liberalism and individual rights. For instance, Saunders posits that
citizenship inscribed in the institutions of the welfare state is a buffer against
the vagaries of the market and the inequalities of the class system.
58
Citizenship has typically been based on an individual's obligation to contribute
taxes to a state system of provision. This was a key ingredient of the postwar
Keynesian reconstruction based on assumptions about full employment and the
concept of dual nationality generally undesirable, incompatible with individual loyalties and destabilizing of
the international order. Dual nationality was incompatible with the absolute authority of the state over its
territory and its nationals. See generally IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND
NORTH AMERICA (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989). Indeed, we see the development of a series of
mechanisms aimed at preventing or counteracting the occurrence of de facto dual nationality, such as the
redrawing of borders after wars or the imposition of a new nation-state on an underlying older one. For one of
the most comprehensive examinations backed by archical research, see generally MICHAEL ROBERT MARRUS,
THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1985).
56. See generally LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 3, ch. 3.
57. See generally, e.g., LABORING BELOW THE LINE, supra note 50 (from the perspective of the social
sciences); YOUTH AND WORK IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY OF NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE (Laurence
Roulleau-Berger ed., 2002) [hereinafter YOUTH AND WORK IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY]; see generally
Handler, supra note 50 (providing a legal scholar's perspective).
58. Peter Saunders, Citizenship in a Liberal Society, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 42,
at 57. For an instance of extreme disentitlement in the current period, see Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling
Rights of Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383 (1996).
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preeminence of the nuclear household and exclusive heterosexual relations.
These were the assumptions of the dominant model of Marshallian citizenship.
They have been severely diluted under the impact of globalization and the
ascendance of the market as the preferred mechanism for addressing these
social issues.59
The nature of citizenship has also been challenged by a proliferation of old
issues that have gained new attention. Among the latter are the question of
state membership of aboriginal communities, stateless people, and refugees.
60
All of these have important implications for human rights in relation to
citizenship. These social changes in the role of the nation-state, the impact of
globalization on states, and the relationship between dominant and subordinate
groups also have major implications for questions of identity. "Is citizenship a
useful concept for exploring the problems of belonging, identity and personality
in the modem world?" 61 Important here is Ong's finding that in cross-border
processes, individuals actually accumulate assemblages of partial rights, a form
she calls flexible citizenship.62
Can such a radical change in the conditions for citizenship leave the
institution itself unchanged? This question takes on added meaning when we
consider the cultural and historical specificity of concepts of civil society and
63citizenship in Western social and political theory. Insofar as the new
conditions evident today alter the meaning and content of civil society, they
may well thereby alter citizenship.
From the perspective of nation-based citizenship theory, some of these
transformations might be interpreted as a decline or devaluation of citizenship
or, more favorably, as a displacement of citizenship in the face of other forms
59. Today, the growing weight given to notions of the "competitiveness" of states puts pressure on states to
cut down on these entitlements. This in turn weakens the reciprocal relationship between the poor and the
state. Finally, the growth of unemployment and the fact that many of the young are developing weak ties to
the labor market, once thought of as a crucial mechanism for the socialization of young adults, will further
weaken the loyalty and sense of reciprocity between these future adults and the state. See, e.g., YOUTH AND
WORK IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL CITY, supra note 57; LABORING BELOW THE LINE, supra note 50. For an
examination of growing socio-economic inequality resulting from global integration, see Kerry Rittich,
Transformed Pursuits: The Question for Equality in Globalized Markets, 13 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 231 (2000).
60. See, e.g., KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); see
also SASKIA SASSEN, The State and the Foreigner, in GUESTS AND ALIENS (1999).
61. See TURNER, supra note 42, at ix.
62. See generally AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CULTURAL LOGICS OF TLANSNATIONALITY
(1999).
63. See generally TURNER, supra note 42.
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of collective organization and affiliation, as yet unnamed. 64  Insofar as
citizenship is theorized as necessarily national,65 by definition these new
developments cannot be captured in the language of citizenship. 66  An
alternative interpretation would be to suspend the national, as in post-national,
conceptions and to posit that the issue of where citizenship is enacted is one to
be determined in light of developing social practice.67
In my view, there is a third possibility, beyond these two. It is that
citizenship, even if situated in institutional settings that are "national," is a
possibly changed institution if the meaning of the nation itself has changed.
For me, one empirical question, then, is whether the change brought about by
globalization in particular features of the territorial and institutional
64. See generally Bosniak, supra note 46 (one of the best elaborations of some of these issues); see also
generally Rubenstein & Adler, supra note 41. One issue that captures some of these transformations is the
changing status of dual nationality both in legal and in more general ideological terms. There were no
international accords on dual nationality for most of the history of the modem state. The negative perception
of dual nationality continued into the first half of the twentieth century and well into the 1960s. The main
effort by the international system was to root out the causes of dual nationality by means of multilateral
codification of the law on the subject. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of
Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997). It was not until the 1990s that we see a proliferation of such
accords. Today, more people than ever before hold dual nationality. For Spiro, this possibility of multiple
allegiances indicates that national citizenship might be less important than it once was. Id. at 1414; see also
SOYSAL, supra note 40; YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, CHANGING PARAMETERS OF CITIZENSHIP AND
CLAIMS-MAKING: ORGANIZED ISLAM IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERES (EUI Working Papers, EUF No. 96/4,
1996); Miriam Feldblum, Reconfiguring Citizenship in Western Europe, in CHALLENGE TO THE NATION-
STATE: IMMIGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, supra note 2, at 231 (interpreting the
increase in dual nationality in terms of post-national citizenship rather than a mere devaluing of national
allegiance, but I would argue that it is a partial de-nationalizing of citizenship).
65. See generally GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ONE NATION, TWO CULTURES: A SEARCHING EXAMINATION
OF AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE AFTERMATH OF OUR CULTURAL REVOLUTION (2001).
66. Thus for Karst, "[lI]n the United States today, citizenship is inextricable from a complex legal
framework that includes a widely accepted body of substantive law, strong law-making institutions, and law-
enforcing institutions capable of performing their tasks." See Karst, supra note 48, at 600. Not recognizing
the centrality of the legal issues is, for Karst, a big mistake. Post-national citizenship lacks an institutional
framework that can protect the substantive values of citizenship. Karst does acknowledge the possibility of
rabid nationalism and the exclusion of aliens when legal status is made central. Id.
67. See, e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 40, at 136-62; JACOBSON, supra note 54, at 73-74. There is a growing
body of literature that is expanding the content of citizenship. For instance, some scholars focus on the
affective connections that people establish and maintain with one another in the context of a growing
transnational civil society. See generally GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 2002 (Helmut Anheier et al.
eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY YEARBOOK]; Jean Cohen, Interpreting the Notion of Global
Civil Society, in I TOWARD GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CURRENTS 35-40 (Michael
Walzer ed., 1995); LIPSCHUTZ & MAYER, supra note 11. Citizenship here resides in identities and
commitments that arise out ofcrossborder affiliations, especially those associated with oppositional politics.
See, e.g., Falk, The Making of Global Citizenship, supra note 11, at 39-50; see also Hunter, supra note 36, at
559-60 (for a legal elaboration). Citizenship might include, however, the corporate professional circuits that
are instances of partly deterritorialized global cultures. See SASKIA SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY
111-12 (2000).
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organization of state authority is also transforming the institution of citizenship,
and, importantly, whether this transformation is occurring even when
citizenship remains centered in the national state, i.e. barring post-national
versions of citizenship.68 A further empirical question would be where these
impacts are evident: in the formal rights of citizenship, in citizens' practices, or
in the psychological dimensions of the institution.
The national remains a referent in my work-though perhaps in a different
manner than in the work of a scholar such as Jacobson, whom I read as more
engaged with identifying non-national locations for citizenship. But, clearly, it
is a referent of a specific sort: it is, after all, the changes in state work and state
authority that become the key theoretical feature through which it enters my
specification/hypothesis of changes in the institution of citizenship. Whether
some of these changes devalue nation-based citizenship, as Jacobson would
argue, is not immediately evident to me at this point. This is partly because I
read the institution of citizenship as having undergone many transformations in
its history precisely because it is to variable extents embedded in the specifics
of each of its eras.69 Significant here is also the fact that it was through national
law that many expanded inclusions were instituted, inclusions which then in
turn can destabilize older notions of citizenship.7°
The pluralized meaning of citizenship, partly produced by the formal
expansions of the legal status of citizenship, is today contributing to the
explosion of the boundaries of that legal status, e.g. the increasing number of
states that now grant dual nationality, EU citizenship, and the strengthening of
68. Bosniak grasps some of this when she asserts that for some scholars, like Jacobson and me, there is a
devaluing of citizenship but that this citizenship still has the nation-state as its referent and in that regard is not
a postnational interpretation. See Bosniak, supra note 46, at 449-50.
69. In this regard, I have emphasized as significant the introduction in the new constitutions of South
Africa, Brazil, Argentina and the Central European countries of a provision that qualifies what had been an
unqualified right (if democratically elected) of the sovereign to be the exclusive representative of its people in
international fora. See LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 3, at 131.
70. One such instance of destabilizing older notions of citizenship comes indirectly through changes in the
institution ofalienage. In Karst's interpretation of U.S. law, "aliens are constitutionally entitled to most ofthe
guarantees of equal citizenship, and the Supreme Court has accepted this idea to a modest degree." See Karst,
supra note 48, at 599 (showing cases to support this premise) (emphasis added). Karst also notes that the
Supreme Court has not carried this development nearly as far as it could have (and he might wish), thereby
signaling that the potential for transforming the institution may well be higher than the actual disposition to
change it. Id. A significantly transformed institution of alienage would have some impact on changing at
least some features of the meaning of citizenship. For a very different type of examination, see PETER H.
SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY
(1985). For an extraordinary account ofhow the U.S. polity and legal system have constructed the subject of
the immigrant, particularly the "Asian-American," see DAVID PALUMBO-LiU, ASIAN-AMERICAN:
HISTORICAL CROSSINGS OF A RACIAL FRONTIER (1999).
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human rights. All of these have been interpreted as loosening the "national
grip" on citizens' rights. I would add two other elements that show that this
loosening grip is also related to changes internal to the national state.7 '
First-and most importantly in my reading-is the strengthening, including
the constitutionalizing, of rights that allow citizens to make claims against their
states and allow them to invoke a measure of autonomy in the formal political
arena that can be read as lengthening the distance between the formal apparatus
of the state and the institution of citizenship. The implications, both political
and theoretical, of this dimension are complex and in the making: we cannot
tell what the practices and rhetoric will be that might be invented and deployed.
Second, I add to this the granting by national states of a whole range of
"rights" to foreign actors, largely and especially economic actors-foreign
firms, foreign investors, international markets, and foreign business people.72
Admittedly, this is not a common way of framing the issue. It comes out of my
particular perspective of the impact of globalization and denationalization on
the national state, including the impact on the relation between the state and its
own citizens, and the state and foreign actors. I see this as a significant, though
not much recognized, development in the history of claim-making. For me, the
question of how citizens should handle these new concentrations of power and
"legitimacy" that attach to global firms and markets is a key to the future of
democracy. Detecting the extent to which the global is embedded and filtered
through the national (e.g. the concept of the global city, and the issues
discussed in the first section here) is one way of understanding whether a
possibility lies therein for citizens, still largely confined to national institutions,
to demand accountability of global economic actors through national
institutional channels, rather than having to wait for a "global" state.
71. This interpretation also affects my reading of a literature that centers on location as a criterion for
specifying citizenship. See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 46, at 448-54. This criterion is rendered problematic
insofar as I argue that some components of the "non-national" are embedded in the national and hence we
would need to decode what is national about the national. The question of the territorial base triggers a similar
problem. Id. In my reading, the meaning of the territorial has changed. See also LOSING CONTROL?, supra
note 3. An added element is the emergence of digital space as significant for a whole variety of activities,
from economics to citizenship practices. See, e.g., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY YEARBOOK, supra note 67.
72. See LOSING CONTROL?, supra note 3, at 131.
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